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6Abstract 
This paper analyses the behaviour of credit default swaps (CDS) for a sample of firms and finds 
support for the theoretical equivalence of CDS prices and credit spreads.  When this is violated, 
the CDS price can be viewed as an upper bound on the price of credit risk, while the spread 
provides a lower bound.  The paper shows that the CDS market is the main forum for credit risk 
price discovery and that CDS prices are better integrated with firm-specific variables in the short 
run.  Both markets equally reflect these factors in the long run, and this is primarily brought about 
by bond market adjustment. 
Key words:  Credit default swaps, credit spreads, price discovery. 
7Summary 
Risky corporate and sovereign bonds are among the most recent securities to benefit from the 
trading of associated derivative contracts.  Credit derivatives are financial instruments that can be 
used to transfer credit risk from the investor exposed to the risk (the protection buyer) to an 
investor willing to assume that risk (the protection seller).  Single-name credit default swaps 
(CDS) are the most liquid of the several credit derivatives currently traded and form the basic 
building blocks for more complex structured credit products.  A single-name CDS is a contract 
that provides protection against the risk of a credit event by a particular company or country.  The 
buyer of protection makes periodic payments to the protection seller until the occurrence of a 
credit event or the maturity date of the contract, whichever is first.  If a credit event occurs the 
buyer is compensated for the loss (possibly hypothetically) incurred as a result of the credit event, 
which is equal to the difference between the par value of the bond or loan and its market value 
after default. 
This paper addresses the validity and implications of a theoretical relationship equating credit 
default swap prices and credit spreads using data for a small cross-section of US and European 
firms for which high-quality data are available.  For this sample of investment-grade firms, the 
theoretical arbitrage relationship linking credit spreads over the risk-free rate to CDS prices holds 
reasonably well on average for most of the companies (but especially for US firms), when the 
risk-free rate is proxied by the swap rate.  Where the relationship does not hold, imperfections in 
the CDS market or measurement errors in the credit spread may be responsible.  Due to contract 
specifications in credit default swaps, particularly in Europe, a cheapest-to-deliver option may 
also be included in the CDS price making it an upper bound on the true price of credit risk.  We 
are unable to incorporate the repo cost of corporate bonds in our analysis due to a lack of reliable 
data.  As a result, the measured credit spread may underestimate the true credit spread, and so 
forms a lower bound on the true price of credit risk.  Subject to these caveats, for most reference 
entities, both the cash bond and credit default swap markets appear to price credit risk equally on 
average.  We demonstrate, however, that price discovery takes place primarily in the CDS 
market. We speculate that price discovery occurs in the CDS market because of (micro)structural 
factors that make it the most convenient location for the trading of credit risk, and because there 
are different participants in the cash and derivative market who trade for different reasons.   
8The second part of the paper examines the determinants of changes in the two measures of the 
price of credit risk.  Variables suggested by the structural literature on credit risk are capable of 
explaining around one quarter of the weekly changes in credit default swap prices.  The same 
variables are less successful in capturing changes in credit spreads.  Firm-specific equity returns 
and implied volatilities are statistically more significant and of greater economic importance for 
CDS prices than for credit spreads.  The pricing discrepancy between CDS prices and credit 
spreads is closed primarily through changes in the credit spread, reflecting the CDS market’s lead 
in price discovery.  It is through this error correction mechanism that both CDS and credit 
spreads price credit risk equally in the long run.  We argue that these findings are supportive of 
the structural models of credit risk.   
91 Introduction 
Risky corporate and sovereign bonds are among the most recent securities to benefit from the 
trading of associated derivative contracts.  Credit derivatives are financial instruments that can be 
used to transfer credit risk from the investor exposed to the risk (the protection buyer) to an 
investor willing to assume that risk (the protection seller).  The payoffs to a credit derivative are 
conditional on the occurrence of a credit event.  The credit event is defined with respect to one or 
more reference entities and one or more reference assets issued by the reference entity.   
Single-name credit default swaps (CDS) are the most liquid of the several credit derivatives 
currently traded and form the basic building blocks for more complex structured credit 
products.(1)  A single-name CDS is a contract that provides protection against the risk of a credit 
event by a particular company or country. The buyer of protection makes periodic payments to 
the protection seller until the occurrence of a credit event or the maturity date of the contract, 
whichever is first. If a credit event occurs the buyer is compensated for the loss (possibly 
hypothetically) incurred as a result of the credit event, which is equal to the difference between 
the par value of the bond or loan and its market value after default.  The economic effect of a 
credit default swap is similar to that of an insurance contract.  The legal distinction comes from 
the fact that it is not necessary to hold an insured asset (eg the underlying bond or loan) in order 
to claim ‘compensation’ under a CDS.  Speculators can take long (short) positions in credit risk 
by selling (buying) protection without needing to trade the cash instrument.   
Credit derivatives are almost exclusively over-the-counter transactions that can be designed to 
meet the specific needs of the counterparties to the contract.  However, recognising that the 
standardisation of a contract can act as a major spur to the growth of a market, the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) released sets of Credit Derivatives Definitions in 
1999 (which were amended in 2001) and 2003.  The majority of credit derivatives transactions 
are documented according to ISDA definitions. Accordingly, having only been introduced in 
1992, the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) estimated the total notional value of outstanding 
credit derivatives (excluding asset swaps) to be US$1.19 trillion at the end of 2001.(2)
(1) Other basic credit derivatives include total return swaps, where the return from one asset or group of assets is 
swapped for the return on another, and credit spread options, which are options on the spread between the yield 
earned on two assets. 
(2) The rapid growth rate should not disguise the fact that the credit derivatives market is still relatively small.  The 
total notional outstanding value of interest rate swaps was estimated to be US$49 trillion at the end of 2000 (Bank for 
International Settlements (2000)), or around two to three times the value of the underlying cash instrument.  
Outstanding credit derivatives only amount to some 2%-3% of the value of underlying assets.   
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Single-name credit default swaps accounted for 45% of this total (BBA (2002)). 
Credit default swaps arguably provide the easiest way to trade credit risk.  Many corporate bonds 
are bought by investors who simply hold them to maturity (Alexander, Edwards and Ferri 
(1998)).  Secondary market liquidity is therefore often poor making the purchase of large 
amounts of credit risk in the secondary cash market difficult and costly (Schultz (1998)).  
Shorting credit risk is even more difficult in the cash market.  The repurchase agreement (repo) 
market for risky bonds is often illiquid, and even if a bond can be shorted on repo the tenor of the 
agreement is usually very short, leaving the investor looking to short a bond for a long period of 
time exposed to changes in the repo rate.  Credit derivatives, especially credit default swaps allow 
investors to short credit risk over a long period of time at a known cost by buying protection.   
We think that credit default swaps warrant study for two reasons.  The first relates to the issue of 
price discovery.  As we discuss further below, there are approximate arbitrage relationships that 
mean bond spreads and CDS prices should normally be closely linked.  For other asset classes 
where an arbitrage relationship exists between the derivative and underlying instrument, price 
discovery can take place in either market.  It is interesting to see whether the new, small but 
dynamic credit derivatives market is a better source of information on the price of credit risk than 
the much larger and more established cash bond market.  Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue 
that, in the presence of short-sales constraints, good and particularly bad news is impounded into 
the price more slowly than in the absence of constraints.  The less constrained derivatives market 
might then conceivably be the forum within which the majority of price discovery takes place.  
Indeed, this is what we demonstrate below.   
Second, recent empirical work has suggested that the yield offered by defaultable securities in 
excess of the risk-free rate is only partly related to credit risk.  Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann 
(2001) find that taxation and risk premia compensating for systematic risk on corporate bonds 
together account for two-thirds of the spread between ten-year US corporate bonds and treasuries.  
The expected loss from default accounts for only 18%.  Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin 
(2001) show that the factors suggested by traditional models of default risk explain only one 
quarter of the variation in credit spreads, and that the majority of the remaining variance is 
captured by a single principal component.  They hypothesise that aggregate shocks are the source 
of the common factor.  While credit derivatives prices are usually closely related to credit 
spreads, we show that a higher proportion of the variation in CDS prices can be explained by 
default-risk related factors. 
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The empirical literature on credit default swaps is quite small.  Cossin, Hricko, Aunon-Nerin and 
Huang (2002) consider the factors that determine the level of CDS prices using a cross-section of 
transactions prices, and suggest that the integration between equity and credit markets was less 
than perfect, at least until September 2000 when their data end.  Houweling and Vorst (2002) fit a 
reduced-form model to CDS quotations with parameters extracted from the bond markets.  They 
conclude that cross-sectionally the CDS and cash bond market price credit risk equally for 
investment-grade bonds.  Finally, Skinner and Townend (2002) interpret credit default swaps as 
put options and regress CDS prices on factors that should influence their price in this framework 
with modest success.
In this paper we add to this literature by examining the time series properties of credit default 
swap prices in conjunction with matching credit spread data.  The paper addresses three main 
issues.  First, it questions whether bond and credit default swap markets price default risk equally.  
Second, it examines whether credit risk price discovery takes place predominantly in the cash 
bond or credit derivative market.  Third, it examines the factors that influence short-run changes 
in CDS prices and credit spreads.  The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 describes the 
credit default swap market and the relationship between CDS prices and credit spreads.  Section 3 
describes the data used.  Section 4 investigates empirically the short and long-term relationships 
between CDS prices and spreads.  Section 5 considers the determinants of changes in credit 
spreads and CDS prices.  Section 6 contains concluding comments. 
2 Credit default swaps and credit spreads 
2.1 The credit default swap market
In a credit default swap, the protection seller agrees to pay the default payment to the protection 
buyer if a default event has happened before maturity of the contract.  If there is no default event 
before maturity, the protection seller pays nothing.  The protection seller charges a fee for the 
protection.  This is typically a constant quarterly fee paid until default or maturity, whichever is 
first.  Should a default event happen, the accrued fee is also paid.  We refer to the annualised fee 
as the credit default swap price.  The default payment is either repayment at par against physical 
delivery of a reference asset (physical settlement) or the notional amount minus the post-default 
market value of the reference asset determined by a dealer poll (cash settlement).  Physical 
delivery is the dominant form of settlement in the market.  A broad set of debt obligations is 
deliverable as long as they rank pari passu with the senior unsecured indebtedness of the  
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reference entity.  Default events for CDS might include some or all of the following: 
A. Bankruptcy 
B. Failure to pay 
C. Obligation default or acceleration 
D. Repudiation or moratorium (for sovereign entities) 
E. Restructuring 
The first four are not contentious, although the evolving ISDA documentation has dropped events 
C and D in some jurisdictions since they have been deemed subsumed by events A and B.  
Restructuring has been and remains a source of controversy in the CDS market.  The 1999 ISDA 
documentation defines restructuring to constitute a default event if either the interest rate or 
principal paid at maturity are reduced or delayed, if an obligation’s ranking in payment priority is 
lowered or if there is a change in currency or composition of any payment (excluding adoption of 
the euro by a member state of the European Union).  The key problem is that not all deliverable 
assets necessarily become due and payable should restructuring occur and it is conceivable that 
some deliverable obligations will be cheaper than others.  This is likely to be particularly acute 
where deliverable assets include very long-dated or convertible bonds that often trade at a 
discount to shorter-dated straight bonds. This means that where there is a non-negligible 
probability of a restructuring that falls short of making all debt due and payable and where some 
obligations trade at a substantial discount to others, then a physically-settled CDS price also 
contains a cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option and is not a pure measure of credit risk. European 
CDS traded on the basis of this definition throughout our data sample.  US CDS have been 
subject to a Modified Restructuring definition since 11 May 2001 that, among other aspects, 
restricted the scope of deliverable assets and specifically prevents the delivery of very long-dated 
bonds.  This reduces the value of the delivery option in US default swaps.  
2.2 Pricing of credit risk 
There is a large and growing literature on the pricing of credit risk, within which two approaches 
dominate.  Structural models are based on the value of the firm and are usually derived from 
Merton (1974).  In this class of models default occurs when the process describing the value of 
the firm hits a given boundary.  Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977) and Longstaff and Schwartz 
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(1995) are three of many important references.  Das (1995) and Pierides (1997) apply structural 
models to the pricing of credit derivatives.  The second approach, usually termed reduced-form or 
intensity-based models, instead assume that the timing of default is specified in terms of a hazard 
rate.  Leading reduced-form frameworks would include Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Jarrow, 
Lando and Turnbull (1997) and Duffie and Singleton (1999).  Das and Sundaram (1998), Duffie 
(1999) and Hull and White (2000a, 2000b) apply reduced-form models to credit derivative 
pricing issues. Both structural and reduced-form approaches are very comprehensively surveyed 
in Lando (1997) and Schonbucher (2000).  
This paper does not contribute to the literature on credit risk pricing.  Instead it will make use of 
the approximate arbitrage relationship that exists between credit default swap prices and credit 
spreads for a given reference entity discussed in Duffie (1999) and Hull and White (2000a).  
Begin with a loose approximate arbitrage relationship.  Suppose an investor buys a T-year par 
bond with yield to maturity of y issued by the reference entity, and buys credit protection on that 
entity for T-years in the credit default swap market at a cost of pCDS.  The investor has eliminated 
most of the default risk associated with the bond.  If pCDS is expressed as an annual payment as a 
percentage of the notional principal then the investor’s net annual return is y – pCDS.  By arbitrage, 
this net return should approximately equal the T-year risk-free rate, denoted by x.  For y – pCDS
less than x, shorting the risky bond, writing protection in the CDS market and buying the risk-free 
instrument would be a profitable arbitrage opportunity.  Similarly, for y – pCDS greater than x,
buying the risky bond, buying protection and shorting the risk-free bond is profitable.  This 
suggests that the price of the CDS, pCDS, should equal the credit spread, y – x.
This is the relationship used in the empirical analysis that follows, although we recognise that the 
arbitrage is only perfect in some instances.  Duffie (1999) shows that the spread on a par risky 
floating-rate note over a risk-free floating-rate note exactly equals the CDS price.  Unfortunately, 
floating-rate notes are rare.  The spread on par fixed-coupon risky bond over the par fixed-coupon 
risk-free bond exactly equals the CDS price if the payment dates on the CDS and bond coincide 
and recovery on default is a constant fraction of face value (Houweling and Vorst (2002)).  
Alternatively, with a flat risk-free curve and constant interest rates, the arbitrage is perfect if the 
payout from a CDS on default is the sum of the principal amount plus accrued interest on a risky 
par yield bond times one minus the recovery rate (Hull and White (2000a)).  As noted above, 
however, the payout from a CDS usually equals the principal amount minus the recovery rate 
times the sum of principal and accrued interest on the reference obligation.  Nevertheless the 
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referenced papers show that the arbitrage is reasonably accurate for assets trading close to par 
when interest rates are not high and yield curves are relatively flat.   
Three other considerations are relevant.  First, physically-settled CDS prices, especially for 
European entities, may contain CTD options as noted above.  Other things equal, this will lead 
CDS prices to be greater than the credit spread.  Unfortunately, it is impossible to value this 
option analytically since there is no benchmark for the post-default behaviour of deliverable 
bonds, and hence we cannot simply subtract its value from the CDS price.  Second, the arbitrage 
relationship that should keep the two prices together can rely on short selling the cash bond.  This 
is not always costless and indeed is not always even possible in illiquid corporate bond markets.  
If the repo cost of shorting the cash bond is significant then the credit spread we have computed 
(bond yield minus the risk-free rate) underestimates the true credit spread (bond yield minus  
risk-free rate plus the repo cost). Again, the CDS price will tend to be greater than the measured 
credit spread (Duffie (1999)).  Although both the CTD option and non-zero repo costs can occur 
independently, when a firm’s credit risk increases the demand to short sell the bond rises, driving 
up the repo cost, and the value of the CTD option rises.  Neither market then provides a pure 
measure of credit risk.  Quantifying these two factors is difficult in the absence of reliable repo 
cost data or a valuation model for the option.  However, since both the repo cost and the option 
value are bounded at zero, we can say that the CDS price is an upper limit on the price of credit 
risk while the credit spread provides a lower limit. 
Third, liquidity premia exist in both the cash bond and CDS markets.  The cash bond market is 
often described as relatively illiquid, particularly outside the United States.  Movements in 
liquidity premia may explain a large proportion of the total variation in credit spreads        
(Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001)).  The CDS market is still relatively small despite 
its rapid recent growth and so demand-supply imbalances can often cause short-term price 
movements unrelated to default expectations.  We make strenuous efforts to reduce the 
importance of CDS and bond market liquidity premia for the reference entities we examine, as 
detailed in the following section. 
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3 Data description 
3.1 Credit default swap data
Credit default swaps are over-the-counter derivatives traded mainly in London and New York. 
We use daily indicative bid and ask prices from CreditTrade, a CDS broker, for single-name CDS 
that they deem to be liquid. The data run from 2 January 2001 through 20 June 2002.  The prices 
are for a notional value of $10 million and are based on ISDA benchmark contracts for physical 
settlement. All prices are for five years, which is by far the most liquid maturity in the CDS 
market.  The prices hold at ‘close of business’ (approximately 5pm local time) in London for 
European reference entities, or New York for US names.  Some time series have missing or, very 
occasionally, suspicious values.  We use mid-market data supplied by J.P. Morgan, one of the 
leading players in the CDS market, to fill in missing values, check suspicious entries and for 
general confirmation of the CreditTrade data.(3)  J.P. Morgan’s mid-market prices are only rarely 
outside the bid-ask quotes from CreditTrade.  We retain all US and European companies for 
which we can compute a consistent series of mid-market quotes for at least 250 days by 
combining data sources.   
3.2 Risky bond yield data
In order to match the constant five-year maturity of the CDS contracts we need five-year bond 
yields.  For each reference entity with suitable CDS data we search Bloomberg for a bond with 
between three and five years left to maturity at the start of our sample period, and another bond 
with more than six and a half years to maturity at the start of the sample.  By linearly 
interpolating these yields we are able to estimate a five-year yield to maturity for the full sample 
without extrapolating.  We exclude floating-rate securities and all bonds that have embedded 
options, step-up coupons, sinking funds or any special feature that would result in differential 
pricing.  We are also concerned to minimise the possible impact of illiquidity that appears 
problematic in previous studies using corporate bonds and only use yields calculated from        
so-called ‘generic’ Bloomberg mid-market bond prices.  These are a weighted average of firm 
and indicative quotes submitted by at least five brokers or dealers. The exact weighting method is 
proprietary but firm quotes receive a higher weight than merely indicative quotes.  The risky 
bond data are also at close of business but this tends to be slightly later than the close in the CDS 
market (eg 5:50pm New York time for US corporate bonds).   
(3) J.P. Morgan was the most active trader in the Cossin, Hricko, Aunon-Nerin and Huang (2002) CDS transactions 
database.  
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Where a choice of liquid bond yields is available we use bonds trading relatively close to par and, 
if a choice remains, whose maturity more closely corresponds with our needs.  We prefer par 
bonds due to the imperfect arbitrage considerations mentioned above.  We prefer to minimise the 
difference between maturities to reduce the errors caused by our choice of linear interpolation. 
3.3 Reference rate yield data
The reference rate is used to proxy the risk-free interest rate when credit spreads are calculated.  
Government bond yields are the obvious choice, and we use five-year government bond         
mid-market yields.  The curves are constructed using Treasuries for US reference entities and 
German government bonds for European entities.  However, it is well known that government 
bonds are no longer an ideal proxy for the unobservable risk-free rate.  Taxation treatment, repo 
specials, scarcity premia and benchmark status issues are usually cited.  As an alternative proxy 
we also collect five-year swaps rates for dollars and euros. Swaps, being synthetic, are available 
in virtually unlimited quantities so that liquidity is not an issue, and they have the further 
advantage of being quoted on a constant maturity basis.  McCauley (2002) contains a discussion 
of the swap rate’s role as a benchmark.  However, swaps contain credit premia because (i) the 
floating leg is indexed to LIBOR, which is itself a default-risky interest rate (Sundaresan (1991)), 
and (ii) the presence of counterparty risk (although Duffie and Huang (1996) show this accounts 
for just 1-2 basis points).  Hull, Predescu and White (2003) note that the n-year swap rate should 
be thought of as the rate of interest on an n-year loan that is structured such that the obligor is 
certain to have an acceptable credit rating at the beginning of each accrual period.  This accrual 
period is six months for plain vanilla swaps in the United States but may be as high as twelve 
months in other markets.  Since one-year default probabilities of AA-rated institutions is very low 
it is clear that swap rates are very low but not quite risk-free rates.  Duffie (1999) and Houweling 
and Vorst (2002) recommend using general collateral or repo rates in preference to swaps, 
arguing that these are liquid and virtually risk free.  Accordingly, they lie below maturity 
matched swap rates.  Unfortunately, general collateral rates are only available for maturities up to 
one year, and since the term structure is typically upward sloping during our data period we 
prefer to use swaps rates.   
The 33 reference entities for which we can find both CDS and interpolated bond yields are listed 
in Table A together with some basic description.  This is a small cross-section of the 157 US and 
European reference entities in the CreditTrade CDS database.  Of these, 38 have been dropped 
due to insufficient CDS data and 86 due to a lack of bond data.  In many cases matrix bond prices 
are available but we are reluctant to use these due to problems relating to the accuracy, reliability  
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Table A 
Descriptive statistics 
This table lists the reference entities in our sample, together with basic descriptive information and the number of 
observations in the credit default swap and credit spread series.  See Section 2 of the paper for details on the criteria 
for inclusion in the sample. 
    Observations 
 Country Sector Rating CDS Bond yield 
AOL US Internet BBB 370 381 
Bank of America US Banking A 378 381 
Bank One US Banking A 378 376 
Bear Stearns US Banking A 371 376 
Citigroup US Banking AA 378 383 
FleetBoston US Banking A 353 329 
Ford Motor Credit Corp US Automobile/Finance BBB 378 359 
GE Capital Corp US Finance AAA 365 382 
General Motors Credit Corp US Automobile/Finance BBB 350 374 
Goldman Sachs US Banking A 378 381 
J.P. Morgan Chase US Banking AA 350 369 
Lehman Brothers US Banking A 378 377 
Merrill Lynch US Banking AA 378 378 
Morgan Stanley US Banking AA 378 375 
Wal-Mart US Retail AA 378 371 
Wells Fargo US Banking A 367 350 
Barclays UK Banking AA 367 271 
British Telecom UK Telecommunications A 378 377 
Commerzbank Germany Banking A 367 258 
DaimlerChrysler Germany Automobile BBB 360 376 
Deutsche Telecom Germany Telecommunications BBB 378 382 
Dresdner Bank Germany Banking AA 367 382 
Endesa Spain Utilities A 367 349 
Fiat Italy Automobile A 367 383 
France Telecom France Telecommunications BBB 378 380 
Iberdrola Spain Utilities A 367 379 
Metro AG Germany Retail BBB 287 337 
Siemens Germany Telecommunications AA 367 265 
Telefonica Spain Telecommunications A 378 382 
Total Fina Elf France Oil AA 367 374 
United Utilities UK Utilities A 365 365 
Vodafone UK Telecommunications A 378 379 
Volvo Sweden Automobile A 367 382 
and timeliness of such data. The data we use are not ideal.  For example, we would have 
preferred to use transactions prices rather than quotes.  Cossin, Hricko, Aunon-Nerin and Huang 
(2002) consider CDS transactions data but do not have enough observations on particular 
reference entities to perform time series analysis.  Month-end corporate bond transactions data 
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are available from Capital Access International (used by Schultz (1998), Hong and Warga (2000) 
and Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998)) but we need a daily frequency to match the CDS data.  
The data we use are then the best we think available for our purpose. 
4 The empirical relationship between credit default swaps and credit spreads 
4.1 Average pricing of credit risk 
If both CDS and cash bonds price default risk equally then, subject to the arbitrage imperfections 
noted above, the spread on the risky bond over a risk-free reference rate should equal the CDS 
price of the same maturity.  Define the basis to be the difference between the time t CDS price, 
pCDS,t, and the credit spread, pCS,t:
 
 govttttCDSgovttCStCDSgovtt
swaps
tttCDS
swaps
tCStCDS
swaps
t
xypppbasis
xypppbasis
  
  
ˆ
ˆ
,,,
,,,      (1)
where yˆ denotes the interpolated five-year yield on the risky bond, xswaps denotes the five-year 
swap rate, and xgovt is the five-year government bond yield.  In the first panel of Table B we give 
the average basis and the average absolute basis for each of our reference entities using both swap 
rates and government bond yields as candidate reference rates.  Chart 1 gives a representative plot 
of daily CDS prices and credit spreads over swaps for Ford. 
The cross-sectional mean of the time series average bases is -41 basis points using five-year 
government bond yields as a proxy for the reference rate.  The mean average basis is just +6 basis 
points if five-year swap rates are used.  Similarly the mean average absolute basis falls from 46 
basis points over government bonds to 15 basis points over swaps.  Using median values does not 
alter the story.  These results are consistent with Houweling and Vorst (2002) who found an 
average absolute pricing error of around 11 basis points when using swap rates and of around 33 
basis points when using treasury yields for bonds rated A and AA.  The second panel of Table B 
gives mean average basis and mean average absolute basis with the data split by credit rating and 
location.  The mean average absolute basis over swaps rises as credit quality (proxied by rating) 
declines, a finding also emphasised by Houweling and Vorst (2002).  Similarly, the basis over 
swaps is higher for European corporates (partly because the average rating of the European 
corporates is lower).  Given these results we compute credit spreads using swap rates as the proxy 
for default-free interest rates in our subsequent analysis. 
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Chart 1
Credit default swap price and credit spread over swaps for Ford 
The previous results suggest that the theoretical relationship linking credit spreads over the     
risk-free rate to CDS prices holds reasonably well on average for most reference entities (and 
especially for US firms).  However, for some reference entities the average basis over swaps is 
meaningfully greater than zero.  The two extreme cases are France Telecom (64 basis points) and 
Fiat (45 basis points), with the former plotted in Chart 2.  Traders indicate that large and 
persistent positive bases such as these are due to the presence of the two imperfections noted 
above – non-zero repo costs in the bond market mean we have underestimated the true credit 
spread and the cheapest-to-deliver option inflates the CDS price.  J.P. Morgan (2002) illustrates 
the importance of including repo costs for a cross-section of 19 bonds with the largest basis from 
their universe of priced bonds on 16 August 2002 (unfortunately just after our sample ends).  A 
France Telecom eight-year bond had the highest basis on that day (186 basis points) but it was 
impossible to borrow this bond on repo making the true credit spread impossible to calculate.  
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Table B 
Discrepancies in the average pricing of credit risk in credit default swap and cash bond 
markets
Panel A provides descriptive statistics of the basis, defined to be the difference between the credit default swap price 
and the credit spread, for each reference entity and expressed in basis points.  The credit spread is calculated as the 
difference between the interpolated five-year yield on the risky bonds and either the five-year treasury bond rate or 
the five-year swap rate.  Panel B provides summary statistics for groups of bonds according to rating and nationality. 
Panel A: Treasury rates Swap rates 
 Average basis 
Average absolute 
basis Average basis 
Average absolute 
basis
AOL -49.4 51.1 13.0 16.6 
Bank of America -66.1 66.1 -3.6 10.0 
Bank One -68.0 68.0 -5.6 8.9 
Bear Stearns -67.6 67.6 -9.6 12.7 
Citigroup -56.8 56.8 5.7 7.6 
FleetBoston -60.6 60.6 7.1 8.5 
Ford Motor Credit Corp -59.5 59.8 2.6 11.1 
GE Capital Corp -38.7 38.9 23.2 23.2 
General Motors Credit Corp -51.8 51.8 10.7 12.1 
Goldman Sachs -66.3 66.3 -3.8 7.7 
J.P. Morgan Chase -65.0 65.0 0.9 11.5 
Lehman Brothers -70.2 70.2 -7.8 10.4 
Merrill Lynch -57.5 57.5 6.3 10.2 
Morgan Stanley -63.0 63.0 -0.4 9.4 
Wal-Mart -42.0 42.0 20.6 20.8 
Wells Fargo -66.8 66.8 -3.8 7.0 
Barclays -17.8 17.8 5.9 6.1 
British Telecom -73.3 73.3 -10.1 15.0 
Commerzbank -11.6 12.0 12.8 12.9 
DaimlerChrysler -54.9 54.9 7.9 11.3 
Deutsche Telecom -5.2 22.5 23.2 24.1 
Dresdner Bank -22.2 22.2 5.0 6.8 
Endesa -37.1 37.1 -9.9 9.9 
Fiat 15.6 51.8 44.0 45.3 
France Telecom 35.8 42.0 64.2 64.2 
Iberdrola -45.2 45.2 -16.7 16.7 
Metro AG -30.6 30.6 -17.3 17.9 
Siemens -13.4 14.5 10.9 11.0 
Telefonica -16.1 17.8 12.3 12.5 
Total Fina Elf -37.2 37.2 -9.2 9.9 
United Utilities -33.0 33.0 -4.6 5.7 
Vodafone -14.1 16.6 14.4 14.4 
Volvo -35.8 35.8 -7.3 10.1 
Mean -40.8 45.9 5.5 14.6 
Median -45.2 51.1 5.0 11.1 
Panel B: Treasury rates Swap rates 
Means Average basis 
Average absolute 
basis Average basis 
Average absolute 
basis
AAA-AA -41.4 41.5 6.9 11.6 
A -44.8 49.3 0.5 13.0 
BBB -30.8 44.7 14.9 22.5 
US -59.3 59.5 3.0 11.7 
Europe -23.3 33.2 7.5 17.9 
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Chart 2
Credit default swap price and credit spread over swaps for France Telecom 
The average basis for the remaining 18 bonds was 103 basis points but once the repo cost was 
added to the credit spread over swaps the average repo-adjusted basis fell to 13 basis points.   
High basis levels remain for some bonds even after including repo costs.  For example, the eight 
European reference entities on the list had an average basis of 96 basis points and an average 
repo-adjusted basis of 29 basis points.(4)  This rather large residual is, we argue, primarily due to 
the cheapest-to-deliver option.  A natural experiment illustrates the potential value of such 
options.  On 11 December 2001, Fiat issued a bond convertible into the stock of General Motors.  
This bond traded at a substantial discount to existing straight Fiat bonds.  If restructuring was 
thought possible for Fiat (and press reports around the time suggest it was) this would increase 
the value of the CTD option since under ISDA documentation this was a deliverable bond.  Chart 3 
(4) The US entities had an average basis of 109 basis points and an average repo-adjusted basis of –0.5 basis points, 
consistent with the hypothesis that CTD options are less important in this jurisdiction. 
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Chart 3
Fiat’s convertible bond issue and the value of the cheapest-to-deliver option 
illustrates the behaviour of the CDS price, credit spread and basis around this time.  The 
average basis for Fiat from the start of the sample to 10 December 2001 was just 8.8 basis points.  
In the period immediately before the issue the basis fluctuated around this level, suggesting no 
large repo costs or valuable CTD option. Immediately following the issue, the basis jumped to 50 
basis points, due almost entirely to the increase in the CDS price since the credit spread was 
relatively stable over the issue.  Since we have no evidence that Fiat’s extant straight bonds went 
special after the issue, we ascribe this jump in the basis to the newly emerged CTD option 
value.(5)
These cases of large average basis levels are the exception rather than the rule in our sample.  A 
more formal test of the equivalence of the price of credit risk across the two markets can be 
motivated in terms of transitory and permanent price movements.  Suppose that the unobservable 
efficient price of credit risk, mt, follows a random walk: 
ttt umm  1           (2)
(5) The basis also jumped in subsequent months when Fiat was affected by rating agency actions and equity issuance 
likely to have altered the valuation of the option. 
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where ut is i.i.d. with zero mean and constant variance.  The observed price in each market j at 
time t, pj,t, is equal to this efficient price plus a component containing microstructural noise, sj,t,
assumed to be transient, plus a component reflecting other possibly non-transient factors included 
in the observed price, cj,t:
CSCDSjcsmp tjtjttj ,,,,       (3)
If the two markets price credit risk equally in the long run, then their prices should be 
cointegrated with cointegrating vector [1, -1, c], suggesting a stationary basis, and ideally the 
constant in the cointegrating space, c, should equal zero. Since we know our proxy for the      
risk-free rate is imperfect, however, we do not require that the constant equal zero.  If the prices 
do not cointegrate with the [1, -1, c] restriction imposed then either (i) the two markets price risk 
differently (in excess of a constant amount), (ii) at least one market price contains time-varying 
non-transient factors that reflect something other than credit risk or (iii) at least one market price 
contains time-varying non-transient measurement error.  From our discussion of CDS contract 
specifications in Section 2.1, we suspect a priori that some CDS prices may contain a     
cheapest-to-deliver option related to restructuring likely to result in a case (ii) failure of the 
cointegration tests.  Further, from Section 2.2 we know that the credit spread as measured ignores 
the repo cost of the bond.  If this cost is significant and not purely a short-term phenomenon we 
might expect a case (iii) failure of the cointegration tests. 
We report Johansen cointegration test results for each reference entity in Table C.  There is 
evidence of cointegration under the imposed restriction of a stationary basis for each US 
reference entity examined.(6)  For these firms, the CDS and bond market appear to price risk 
equally on average, at least up to a constant term that possibly reflects mismeasurement of the 
risk-free rate.  Further, we cannot reject the additional restriction that the constant is zero in the 
cointegrating vector for 11 of the 16 US entities at the 1% level, suggesting for these names that 
the credit spread over swaps equals the CDS price over the long run.   
We find support for cointegration for only 10 of the 17 European entities, although a stationary 
basis cannot be rejected at the 1% level for any of these.  The ‘usual suspects’ – France Telecom 
and Fiat – are included in the list of firms that reject cointegration, together with Vodafone, 
another firm with a large average basis over swaps from Table B.  As we have noted, Fiat clearly 
suffers from the sudden emergence of a CTD option and we cannot reject the null of a stationary  
(6) The presence of a cointegrating vector is suggested for all 16 US companies.  Of these, three reject the restriction 
of a stationary basis at the 5% level but none reject at the 1% level. 
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Table C 
The long-run relationship between the price of credit risk in CDS and bond markets 
The first two columns of Panel A present Johansen trace test statistics for the number of cointegrating relationships 
between the credit default swap price and the credit spread over swap rates.  A constant is included in the long-term 
relationship, and the number of lags in the underlying vector autoregression is optimised using the AIC for each 
entity. The third and fourth columns give test statistics for restrictions on the cointegrating space for those entities 
where a cointegrating vector appears to be present.  The first restriction is that the credit default swap price minus the 
credit spread over swaps is constant, and is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom.  The second 
restriction is that the credit default swap price equals the credit spread over swaps, and is distributed as chi-squared 
with two degrees of freedom.  Panel B reports similar tests for Fiat over a restricted sample period.  Rejection of the 
null at 1, 5 or 10% level is indicated by a superscript A, B or C respectively. 
Panel A: Number of cointegrating vectors Restrictions on vector 
 None At most 1 [1, -1, c] [1, -1, 0] 
AOL 42.20A 3.62 3.30C 11.08A
Bank of America 22.43B 5.14 5.61B 5.84C
Bank One 19.19C 2.85 0.16 7.19B
Bear Stearns 25.58A 4.44 0.53 7.38B
Citigroup 21.28B 8.63C 3.53C 8.57B
FleetBoston 20.85B 8.28C 0.02 4.61 
Ford Motor Credit Corp 22.68B 2.12 1.46 2.44 
GE Capital Corp 24.42B 1.92 6.60B 10.29A
General Motors Credit Corp 27.90A 2.26 0.36 16.11A
Goldman Sachs 27.50A 5.03 3.39C 6.79B
J.P. Morgan Chase 25.09A 5.23 3.02C 4.12
Lehman Brothers 54.67A 7.11 0.71 18.60A
Merrill Lynch 21.33B 4.30 0.16 3.73 
Morgan Stanley 22.25B 4.80 6.47B 6.59B
Wal-Mart 27.96A 7.39 1.68 14.81A
Wells Fargo 25.53A 6.44 3.42C 6.62B
Barclays Bank 15.01 2.37 NA NA 
British Telecom 19.59C 4.88 0.90 4.26 
Commerzbank 23.93B 4.48 6.50B 11.26A
DaimlerChrysler 20.43B 2.53 0.01 5.95C
Deutsche Telekom 19.38C 1.10 6.14B 9.09B
Dresdner Bank 17.30 7.70C NA NA 
Endesa 10.92 3.69 NA NA 
Fiat 7.12 1.61 NA NA 
France Telecom 10.11 2.27 NA NA 
Iberdrola 23.06B 5.39 3.31C 15.99A
Metro AG 22.97B 2.56 3.61C 13.39A
Siemens 19.31C 3.08 1.71 6.86B
Telefonica 24.34B 5.07 3.12C 9.26A
Total Fina Elf 13.87 4.20 NA NA 
United Utilities 19.60C 4.99 0.24 8.97B
Vodafone 10.86 2.17 NA NA 
Volvo 21.49B 1.40 1.61 11.85A
   
Panel B: Number of cointegrating vectors Restrictions on vector 
 None At most 1 [1, -1, c] [1, -1, 0] 
Fiat (Jan 2001 – Nov 2001) 27.51A 2.22 1.97 11.05A
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basis using data up to the emergence of the delivery option (see panel B).  Surprisingly, four 
entities with small average bases also reject cointegration.  We suspect that this is because       
bid-ask spreads are proportionately so wide that the CDS price and credit spread have moved in 
seemingly unrelated ways without arbitrage forces coming into effect. 
4.2 Price discovery 
One of the most important functions of financial markets is price discovery, defined by Lehmann 
(2002) to be the efficient and timely incorporation of the information implicit in investor trading 
into market prices.  When there is only one location for trading an asset, by definition all price 
discovery takes place in that market place.  When closely related assets trade in different 
locations, order flow is fragmented and price discovery is split between markets.  We have 
demonstrated that both the cash bond and the credit default swap markets usually appear to price 
credit risk equally on average.  CDS prices and credit spreads are cointegrated I(1) variables for 
most of our sample of companies and the common factor can be viewed as the implicit efficient 
price of credit risk.  Which of the two markets contributes most to the credit risk price discovery 
process is a question that we attempt to resolve in this section. 
The appropriate method to investigate the mechanics of price discovery is not clear.  The two 
popular common factor models due to Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) both 
rely on vector error correction models of market prices.  Hasbrouck’s model of ‘information 
shares’ assumes that price volatility reflects new information, and so the market that contributes 
most to the variance of the innovations to the common factor is presumed to also contribute most 
to price discovery.  Gonzalo and Granger’s approach decomposes the common factor itself and 
ignoring the correlation between the markets attributes superior price discovery to the market that 
adjusts least to price movements in the other market.  When price change innovations are 
correlated, Hasbrouck’s approach can only provide upper and lower bounds on the information 
shares of each market.  However, Baillie, Booth, Tse and Zabotina (2002) argue that the average 
of these bounds provides a sensible estimate of the markets’ roles in the discovery of the efficient 
price.  Since neither method is considered universally superior we report both. 
To compute the measures of the contributions to price discovery it is necessary first to estimate 
the following vector error correction model (VECM): 
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where H1t and H2t are i.i.d. shocks.  If the cash bond market is contributing significantly to the 
discovery of the price of credit risk, then O1 will be negative and statistically significant as the 
CDS market adjusts to incorporate this information. Similarly, if the CDS market is an important 
venue for price discovery, then O2 will be positive and statistically significant. If both coefficients 
are significant, then both markets contribute to price discovery. The existence of cointegration 
means that at least one market has to adjust by the Granger representation theorem (Engle and 
Granger (1987)). That market is inefficient since the price reacts to publicly available 
information.
Manipulations of the relative magnitudes of the O coefficients reveal which of the two markets 
leads in terms of price discovery.  The contributions of market 1 (the CDS market) to price 
discovery are defined by the following expressions: 
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where HAS1 and HAS2 give the two bounds of Hasbrouck’s measures and GG stands for the 
Gonzalo and Granger measure.  The covariance matrix of H1t and H2t is represented by the terms 
V12, V12, V22. The price discovery statistics are reported in panel A of Table D for those entities 
where cointegration is present between CDS prices and credit spreads.  Where appropriate, the 
restrictions that D1 equals unity and D0 equals zero are imposed.
In 25 of the 27 cases Ȝ2 is significantly positive, indicating that the CDS market contributes to 
price discovery.  The cash bond market appears to have a significant role to play in only eight 
cases.  Of these eight, the cash market is the source of all information in only one (United 
Utilities).  In five cases, while both cash and derivatives market contribute significantly the CDS 
market is dominant (defined as both the Hasbrouck lower bound and the Gonzalo-Granger 
measure suggesting more than 50% of the discovery occurring in the CDS market), and in the  
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Table D 
Contributions to price discovery
Panel A reports various measures of the contribution to the credit price discovery process made by credit default 
swap prices for those reference entities where the results in Table C indicate a long-run relationship between credit 
default swap prices and credit spreads exist.  The measures are based on the two regressions:  
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Where appropriate according to the results in Table C, the restriction that D0 equals zero and/or D1 equals unity are 
imposed.  The Hasbrouck measure provides upper and lower bounds to the price discovery contribution made in the 
credit default swap market.  The table also reports the midpoint of this range.  The final column reports the Granger-
Gonzalo measure.  Panel B reports Granger causality test results for those reference entities where the results in 
Table C suggest no long-term relationship between credit default swap prices and credit spreads. 
Panel A:     Hasbrouck GG 
Ȝ1 t-stat Ȝ2 t-stat Lower Upper Mid  
AOL 0.00 0.1 0.12 5.9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 
Bank of America 0.00 0.1 0.05 2.8 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.02 
Bank One -0.06 -3.2 0.08 2.3 0.32 0.38 0.35 0.59 
Bear Stearns -0.03 -1.2 0.14 4.4 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.84 
Citigroup -0.02 -1.1 0.10 2.6 0.76 0.86 0.81 0.80 
FleetBoston 0.00 -0.3 0.12 3.3 0.87 1.00 0.93 0.97 
Ford Motor Credit Corp -0.05 -2.0 0.07 3.1 0.51 0.79 0.65 0.57 
GE Capital Corp 0.00 -0.2 0.08 2.8 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.96 
General Motors Credit Co -0.05 -1.6 0.15 4.4 0.74 0.91 0.82 0.75 
Goldman Sachs -0.04 -1.8 0.13 3.9 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.78 
J.P. Morgan Chase 0.00 -0.1 0.06 4.0 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 
Lehman Brothers -0.05 -2.8 0.21 6.5 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.80 
Merrill Lynch 0.00 -0.2 0.09 3.6 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 
Morgan Stanley -0.02 -1.4 0.09 4.3 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.83 
Wal-Mart  -0.01 -2.6 0.08 3.2 0.55 0.63 0.59 0.85 
Wells Fargo -0.04 -2.0 0.14 3.5 0.74 0.77 0.76 0.78 
British Telecom -0.01 -0.6 0.05 2.6 0.79 0.96 0.88 0.84 
Commerzbank -0.03 -2.2 0.04 1.3 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.64 
DaimlerChrysler -0.03 -1.4 0.07 2.8 0.60 0.86 0.73 0.71 
Deutsche Telecom 0.02 0.9 0.04 3.0 0.92 0.94 0.93 2.06 
Fiat (Jan 01 – Nov 01) -0.06 -1.4 0.12 4.0 0.67 0.92 0.79 0.65 
Iberdrola -0.02 -2.3 0.08 2.9 0.59 0.64 0.62 0.77 
Metro AG -0.01 -0.7 0.09 3.8 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.90 
Siemens -0.01 -0.2 0.13 3.4 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.95 
Telefonica -0.03 -1.5 0.04 3.0 0.63 0.84 0.73 0.55 
United Utilities -0.06 -3.6 0.01 0.7 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.19 
Volvo AB -0.05 -1.9 0.06 3.4 0.61 0.80 0.71 0.55 
Mean     0.74 0.82 0.78 0.79 
Median     0.79 0.91 0.82 0.80 
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remaining two cases the price discovery measures give conflicting signals.  On average, the CDS 
market contributes around 80% of price discovery.(7)  Since the prices are measured 
asynchronously in the bond and CDS markets we re-compute the price discovery measures with 
the CDS prices lagged by one day to deliberately favour the bond market.  While obviously the 
CDS market’s contribution to price discovery is lower in this case, it remains the main forum for 
price discovery. 
For a small subset of our reference entities cointegration is rejected and hence the VECM 
representation is not valid.  We believe that rejection is due to the presence of a substantial 
cheapest-to-deliver option in the CDS price and/or binding short sales constraints in the cash 
bond market meaning that we are markedly mismeasuring the credit spread.  Since we cannot 
price the option or more accurately measure the spread, we rely on the simpler concept of 
Granger causality in a simple VAR in differences to test for price leadership in these cases.  
These results are given in panel B of Table D.  CDS prices Granger-cause credit spreads for four 
of the six entities.  For the other two entities there is no causation in either direction, while credit 
spreads cause CDS prices for three entities (indicating bi-directional causality).  With the 
exception of France Telecom, the sum of the coefficients on lagged CDS prices is noticeably 
greater than for lagged spreads suggesting that the economic importance of CDS prices is greater.   
Why do we find such strong evidence that credit default swap prices lead credit spreads?  Price 
discovery will occur in the market where informed traders trade most.  The CDS market, as we 
noted above, benefits from being arguably the easiest place in which to trade credit risk.  Its 
synthetic nature means that it does not suffer from the short-sales constraints seen in the cash 
bond market, and buying (or selling) relatively large quantities of credit risk is possible.  The  
(7) In three cases the Gonzalo-Granger measure produces a statistic greater than one, which is difficult to interpret.  
In computing the average value, we replaced these numbers by unity. 
Table D—Continued  
Panel B: Ho: CDS causes CS Ho: CS causes CDS 
 Sum of significant 
coefficients 
F-stat p-value Sum of significant 
coefficients 
F-stat p-value 
Barclays 0.41 3.45 0.01 0.07 4.87 0.00 
Dresdner 0.84 3.14 0.01 0.06 1.19 0.32 
Endesa 0.00 2.07 0.13 0.00 0.52 0.60 
France Telecom 0.28 14.17 0.00 0.28 3.08 0.03 
Total Fina Elf 0.00 1.49 0.23 0.00 0.62 0.54 
Vodafone 0.26 5.16 0.01 0.11 2.69 0.07 
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standard CDS contract size is $10 million while Schultz (1998) reports the average cash market 
trade size to be of $1.5 million.  Additionally, the participants in the cash and credit derivatives 
markets are likely to be different.  There is no counterparty risk (beyond settlement risk) when 
trading a cash bond.  CDS trading does entail taking on counterparty risk and for this reason is 
usually restricted to institutions of relatively high credit rating.  Perhaps more importantly, the 
CDS market is the forum for trading credit risk, whereas the cash market trades bond credit risk.  
Participants hedging loan and counterparty exposures are able to do so in the CDS market.  It is 
this concentration of liquidity from different pools that means the CDS market leads the bond 
market according to some market participants. 
Given that CDS prices and credit spreads are linked by an arbitrage relationship, how can the 
markets persist in pricing credit risk differently?  Our answer is in several parts.  First, in the 
absence of transactions costs data we cannot be sure that the discrepancies are large enough to be 
profitable to arbitrageurs.  Second, the arbitrage relationship is only approximate as noted above 
and we are using a synthetic five-year bond spread that is not traded in the market.  Third, we do 
not measure the repo costs of shorting the bond.  It is possible that when the credit quality of an 
entity declines, the repo market price increases such that the arbitrage gap is closed.  It could be 
argued that we have only partially captured the price contribution from the cash market by 
ignoring the repo cost.  However, since repos are not traded for terms in excess of one year, let 
alone the five years necessary in our construct, the repo market cannot contribute towards the 
discovery of the price of five-year credit risk.  Furthermore, even if the holder of a bond sees 
mispricing in the CDS market there are two reasons why he cannot arbitrage the discrepancy – 
fund managers are often not permitted to trade CDS contracts either by national law or mandate, 
and the notional size of the CDS contract is so large that the cash bond holding is unlikely to be 
large enough (see Dhillon (2002)). 
5 The determinants of changes in credit default swap prices and credit spreads 
5.1 Theoretical determinants of credit spread and CDS price changes 
From the contingent-claims approach, credit spreads on corporate bonds occur for two reasons.  
First, there is the possibility of default.  Second, should default occur the bondholder receives 
only a proportion of contracted payments.  Factors related to changes in the probability of a bond 
defaulting or changes in the likely amount recovered should help explain credit spread and CDS 
price changes since the latter are intimately related with the former. However, Table E shows  
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Table E 
Summary statistics of changes in credit default swap prices and credit spreads
This table reports the standard deviation of weekly changes in credit default swap prices and credit spread over 
swaps expressed in basis points for each reference entity, together with the correlation coefficient between the two 
series.  
 Standard deviation Correlation 
 CDS Credit spreads 
AOL 14.57 10.89 0.14 
Bank of America 4.62 7.17 0.25 
Bank One 4.96 7.79 0.22 
Bear Stearns 8.67 8.10 0.05 
Citigroup 4.39 7.40 0.35 
FleetBoston 5.28 5.74 0.40 
Ford Motor Credit Corp 18.51 15.04 0.60 
GE Capital Corp 4.88 6.91 0.24 
General Motors Credit Corp 12.72 12.61 0.68 
Goldman Sachs 6.78 6.92 0.31 
J.P. Morgan Chase 6.16 4.67 0.24 
Lehman Brothers 8.76 9.15 0.14 
Merrill Lynch 6.11 7.58 0.33 
Morgan Stanley 7.39 7.59 0.22 
Wal-Mart  1.89 5.90 0.13 
Wells Fargo 3.16 7.41 0.02 
Barclays 1.24 2.58 0.17 
British Telecom 10.78 11.14 0.67 
Commerzbank 1.86 3.19 -0.05 
DaimlerChrysler 13.29 11.53 0.89 
Deutsche Telecom 17.03 12.60 0.75 
Dresdner Bank 1.58 3.36 0.31 
Endesa 2.65 3.01 -0.01 
Fiat 26.02 14.60 0.86 
France Telecom 26.93 17.22 0.80 
Iberdrola 2.33 3.02 0.16 
Metro AG 4.66 5.35 0.29 
Siemens 4.22 4.16 0.53 
Telefonica 8.29 5.48 0.59 
Total Fina Elf 1.23 3.59 0.23 
Vodafone 6.11 6.61 0.64 
Volvo AB 7.97 5.82 0.51 
that, for our sample, weekly changes in credit spreads and CDS prices are not highly correlated 
and frequently have very different standard deviations.  These figures suggest that the two 
measures of the price of credit risk may not react equally to the factors behind default probability 
and recovery.  This finding motivates our tests of the determinants of changes in CDS prices and 
credit spreads detailed in this section. 
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We follow Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) and consider the following variables as 
factors driving default probability: 
1. Changes in the spot interest rate 
The static effect of a higher spot interest rate increases the risk-neutral drift of the firm’s 
valuation process which reduces the risk-neutral (but not necessarily actual) probability of 
default (Longstaff and Schwartz (1995)).  We use changes in the ten-year bond yield on 
the relevant national Treasury bond. 
2. Changes in the slope of the yield curve 
While only the spot rate matters in the basic structural models, the process that determines 
the spot rate may depend upon other factors such as the slope of the term structure.  For 
example, if the short rate mean-reverts around the long rate, an increase in the term 
structure slope should signal rising future short-term rates and lower default probabilities.  
We use changes in the spread on ten and two-year Treasury bonds from the relevant 
countries to capture slope effects. 
3. Changes in the equity price 
Leverage enters the determination of the default barrier in structural models.  However, at 
a weekly frequency and over a relatively short horizon it is not practical to include a clean 
measure of firm leverage.  Instead we proxy changes in the firm’s health with the firm’s 
equity return. 
4. Changes in implied equity volatility 
An increase in the volatility of the process driving firm value increases the probability of 
hitting the default boundary and so raises the probability of default. Traded options 
markets exist for all but one of our panel so we use changes in the implied volatilities 
from near-the-money put options.  We also consider changes in the implied volatilities of 
the S&P 500 and European Stoxx indices.(8)
We proxy changes in the expected recovery rate with two proxies for changes in the overall 
business climate.  First, we use changes in the slope of the relevant yield curve (defined as  
(8) We also considered changes in the option-implied probability of large drops in a firm’s value.  This is difficult to 
determine for a particular stock since options on individual firms are only liquid near the money, and unfortunately 
the implied probability of a 10% drop in the stock index is highly correlated with implied volatilities.  Therefore this 
variable is not included in the reported regressions but its inclusion does not materially affect the conclusions 
reached. 
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above).  Second, we also consider changes in the S&P 500 or Stoxx index as appropriate. 
Additionally, though we have tried hard to minimise the effects of illiquidity in both markets, 
some liquidity premia may remain.  Changes in liquidity will also affect changes in our measures 
of spreads and CDS prices.  Liquidity is proxied by the on-the-run/off-the-run spread of         
long-dated US Treasury yields.  An increase in the liquidity proxy suggests that liquidity is more 
valuable.   
5.2 Results 
To reduce noise, we measure all changes over a weekly horizon (using Thursday-Thursday 
changes). For each reference entity, i, we first run the following OLS regressions: 
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where ǻ denotes a weekly change in a variable, rl is the long-term government bond yield, rs is 
the short-term government bond yield, eq is the log of relevant national equity market index eqi is 
the log of the equity price of the reference entity, vol is the implied volatility of the S&P 500 
index, and voli is the implied volatility of the reference entity’s equity price.  Panel A of Table F 
summarises the results, reporting the average coefficient estimate and goodness of fit measure 
across the reference entities, together with t-statistics from a cross-sectional regression of the 
individual coefficient estimates on a constant term.  Panel B summarises results from the system 
augmented by the liquidity proxy and, where cointegration was found between CDS and credit 
spreads, the lagged basis defined in equation (1) and interpreted as an error correction term: 
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Panels C and D report the results of pooled estimates of the equations in (5) and (6) where the 
coefficients ȕj and Ȗj are constrained to be equal across entities.  Several interesting results 
emerge. First, most of the significant variables associated with credit default risk are correctly 
signed.  Higher interest rates reduce credit spreads and CDS prices, as do increases in the equity 
price of the reference entity.  Market-wide changes in equity returns (proxying for changes in the  
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Table F 
The sensitivity of credit default swap prices and credit spreads to proxies for default risk, 
the recovery rate, and liquidity
Panels A and C report the results of regression equation (5) as given in the text.  Panels B and D report the results of 
regression equation (6) as given in the text.  Panels A and B are estimated by ordinary least squares individually for 
each reference entity.  Average coefficients and goodness-of-fit measures are given while t-statistics are from cross-
sectional regressions of the individual coefficient estimates on a constant term.  Panels C and D report the results of 
pooled estimates where all coefficients except the intercept terms are restricted to be equal across reference entities. 
Panel A: CDS price Credit spread 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Change in long-term interest rate -6.38 -2.42 -13.19 -5.76 
Change in slope of yield curve 8.11 2.75 13.27 4.54 
Equity market returns 2.68 0.34 -21.77 -1.83 
Firm-specific equity returns -32.55 -2.60 -14.04 -1.66 
Change in market volatility 0.14 1.74 -0.23 -1.48 
Change in firm-specific volatility 0.29 3.74 0.10 1.58 
Average adjusted R2 0.20  0.17  
Panel B: CDS price Credit spread 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Change in long-term interest rate -7.14 -2.77 -13.24 -5.92 
Change in slope of yield curve 7.05 2.14 13.22 4.49 
Equity market returns -8.27 -0.91 -13.08 -1.25 
Firm-specific equity returns -30.82 -2.57 -14.66 -1.80 
Change in market volatility 0.01 0.14 -0.17 -1.24 
Change in firm-specific volatility 0.28 3.47 0.10 1.75 
Change in liquidity 0.17 5.49 0.02 0.91 
Lagged basis -0.07 -5.54 0.19 10.47 
Average adjusted R2 0.23  0.25  
Panel C: CDS price Credit spread 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Change in long-term interest rate -8.38 -5.28 -16.35 -9.08 
Changes in slope of yield curve 8.45 2.76 16.93 6.30 
Equity market returns 23.74 1.74 -11.08 -0.76 
Firm-specific equity returns -49.60 -6.07 -18.18 -2.79 
Change in market volatility 0.24 2.06 -0.14 -1.03 
Change in firm-specific volatility 0.19 3.62 -0.06 -1.05 
Adjusted R2 0.14  0.10  
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recovery rate) are not usually statistically significant but this could be because expected recovery 
rates did not vary much over our relatively short sample period. 
Changes in firm-specific implied volatility are correctly signed and significant for CDS prices but 
insignificant and sometimes incorrectly signed for credit spreads. Market-wide volatility changes 
are correctly signed when significant.  A steeper-sloping yield curve increases CDS prices and 
spreads, which goes against its theoretical sign, either when viewed as a proxy for business 
conditions or to control for mean-reverting interest rates. 
Second, the liquidity proxy is significant only in the CDS market regressions.  While 
acknowledging that our liquidity proxy may be inadequate, this suggests that our attempts to 
minimise the problems of illiquidity in the corporate bond market have been successful.  Despite 
selecting reference entities that are among the most actively quoted, however, changes in 
liquidity appear to impact their CDS prices.  Nevertheless, liquidity does not contribute much to 
the fit of the model since adjusted R2 only increase slightly when the liquidity measure and 
lagged basis are added to the model.   
Third, the credit spread appears to react more to market-wide variables (eg changes in the interest 
rate, slope of the yield curve) than the CDS price, both in terms of coefficient estimate and          
t-statistic.  CDS prices, conversely, react more to firm-specific factors such as the entity’s stock 
price and implied volatility.  We discuss this further below. 
Finally, the lagged basis or error correction term is highly significant and correctly signed in both 
CDS and credit spread equations.  However, the absolute magnitude of the coefficient is much 
Table F—Continued
Panel D: CDS price Credit spread 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Change in long-term interest rate -8.65 -5.51 -15.62 -9.35 
Change in slope of yield curve 7.81 2.57 16.98 6.61 
Equity market returns 15.16 1.12 -0.92 -0.07 
Firm-specific equity returns -48.82 -6.02 -20.39 -3.27 
Change in market volatility 0.13 1.13 -0.08 -0.62 
Change in firm-specific volatility 0.17 3.27 -0.05 -1.07 
Change in liquidity 0.18 4.05 0.00 -0.04 
Lagged basis -0.05 -2.40 0.24 10.81 
Adjusted R2 0.15  0.19  
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greater for credit spreads, confirming the price discovery findings above.(9)  Further, the 
improvement in the goodness of fit for credit spreads when the basis and the insignificant 
liquidity proxy are added is noticeable, with the adjusted R2 rising from 0.10 to 0.19 in the pooled 
regression.  This suggests that while the credit spread reacts less to firm-specific factors, their 
influence feeds through to spreads via the response to the lagged basis.   
The average adjusted R2s in panels A and B are much higher than those from the pooled 
regressions which, together with the results of firm-by-firm regressions (not reported), suggests 
that there is considerable heterogeneity not captured in regressions (5) and (6).  Specifically, the 
coefficients on changes in firm-specific equity price and volatility differ widely across the panel 
for CDS prices and credit spreads.  The absolute magnitudes of the coefficients increase as the 
credit quality, proxied by the credit rating, level of the CDS price or credit spread declines.(10)  As 
examples, Charts 4 and 5 plot for each entity the estimated coefficient on firm equity changes 
(E3) and firm volatility changes (E5) from equation (6) for CDS prices against the average CDS 
price for the full sample.  
The plots suggest that as credit quality worsens, or firms approach the default barrier in a 
structural model, the sensitivity of the price of credit risk to these factors increases.  To 
accommodate this in our econometric work we allow each variable to enter independently and to 
interact with a proxy for the credit quality of the firm in a pooled regression for both CDS and 
credit spreads.(11)  We considered credit ratings and market measures as proxies for credit quality.  
Credit ratings and the average level of the CDS price or credit spread were rejected since several 
of our entities experienced swings in credit quality through the sample that would not be captured 
by an average price or by a slow moving and probably lagging indicator such as the credit rating.  
Instead we use the one period lagged CDS price (for both cash and derivative markets) and 
lagged credit spread (for the cash market).  We estimate models corresponding to equations (5)
(9) The Gonzalo-Granger-type average price discovery measure in the pooled augmented model for CDS is 0.83, not 
far from the 0.79 reported in Table D. 
(10) However, note that our findings are not entirely driven by the companies with lower credit quality.  Results 
corresponding to Table F but estimated for just the AAA-A rated companies produce very similar results.  While 
coefficient estimates are typically lower in absolute terms for these higher-rated companies, statistical significance 
remains.  Interestingly, coefficients on the liquidity proxy and the lagged basis are unchanged from the full sample 
estimates. 
(11) This assumes that the relationship between the coefficient estimate and credit quality is linear whereas a 
structural model would suggest a complex non-linear relationship.  We believe that this simplification captures the 
essence of the heterogeneity without the need to fully specify (and calibrate) a structural model for each reference 
entity. 
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Chart 4
Coefficient estimate on firm-specific equity returns versus average level of credit risk 
Chart 5
Coefficient estimate on firm-specific volatility versus the average level of credit risk 
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Table G 
Sensitivity of credit default swap prices and credit spreads to proxies for default risk, the 
recovery rate, and liquidity: allowing for heterogeneity according to credit quality 
Panel A reports the results of a pooled panel estimate of regression equation (5) in the text with the addition of 
interaction terms where the lagged level of the credit default swap price is multiplied by the independent variable. 
Panel B reports results of a pooled panel estimate of regression equation (6) in the text with additional interaction 
terms.  Panel C reports the results of a parsimonious version of Panel B where insignificant variables are successively 
excluded from the model using a general-to-specific procedure. In the final column of the table the interaction term is 
constructed by multiplying the lagged credit spread over swaps by the independent variable. 
Panel A: CDS price Credit spread Credit spread
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Change in long-term interest rate -3.38 -0.95 -8.49 -2.71 -7.29 -2.40 
CDSt-1uchange in long-term interest rate -0.08 -1.17 -0.12 -2.07 -0.14 -2.53 
Change in slope of yield curve 7.11 1.16 9.90 2.23 15.75 3.87 
CDSt-1uchange in slope of yield curve 0.10 0.87 0.16 1.79 0.07 0.77 
Equity market returns -19.80 -0.60 -41.47 -1.79 -66.52 -3.13 
CDSt-1uequity market returns 0.37 0.70 0.30 0.82 0.75 2.09 
Firm-specific equity returns 35.15 2.62 22.89 2.33 28.60 3.48 
CDSt-1ufirm-specific equity returns -0.93 -4.59 -0.44 -3.09 -0.59 -4.29 
Change in market volatility 0.15 0.62 -0.37 -1.94 -0.63 -3.37 
CDSt-1uchange in market volatility/100 0.08 0.20 0.28 0.89 0.75 2.26 
Change in firm-specific volatility -0.08 -0.66 -0.10 -1.25 -0.13 -1.45 
CDSt-1uchange in firm-specific 
volatility/100 
0.49 2.64 0.15 1.14 0.20 1.44 
Adjusted R2 0.26  0.16  0.16  
    
Panel B: CDS price Credit spread Credit spread 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Change in long-term interest rate -3.88 -1.09 -7.65 -2.64 -6.23 -2.29 
CDSt-1uchange in long-term interest rate -0.07 -1.11 -0.12 -2.34 -0.15 -2.99 
Change in slope of yield curve 6.81 1.16 9.37 2.19 14.05 3.73 
CDSt-1uchange in slope of yield curve 0.10 0.87 0.17 1.99 0.10 1.18 
Equity market returns -27.53 -0.84 -33.22 -1.45 -52.86 -2.64 
CDSt-1uequity market returns 0.37 0.71 0.33 0.92 0.70 2.06 
Firm-specific equity returns 34.77 2.62 21.43 2.22 26.32 3.35 
CDSt-1ufirm-specific equity returns -0.92 -4.59 -0.45 -3.23 -0.59 -4.47 
Change in market volatility 0.02 0.10 -0.31 -1.61 -0.51 -2.86 
CDSt-1uchange in market volatility/100 0.12 0.29 0.28 0.90 0.66 2.07 
Change in firm-specific volatility -0.09 -0.76 -0.13 -1.56 -0.14 -1.70 
CDSt-1uchange in firm-specific 
volatility/100 
0.48 2.60 0.19 1.49 0.23 1.73 
Change in liquidity 0.17 1.91 0.05 0.76 0.09 1.38 
CDSt-1uchange in liquidity 0.00 0.03 -0.00 -0.69 -0.00 -1.17 
Lagged basis -0.05 -2.32 0.25 11.77 0.25 11.71 
Adjusted R2 0.26  0.25  0.24  
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and (6), reported in panels A and B of Table G, together with parsimonious specifications of (6)
where insignificant terms are dropped from the equations (panel C).(12)
The visual impression of Charts 4 and 5 is confirmed by the regression results since the 
interaction of the lagged level of the CDS price with both firm-specific equity returns and      
firm-specific volatility are significant in the CDS regressions.(13)  Including these terms 
significantly raises the adjusted R2.  The interaction terms are important in the credit spread 
equations (as is the interaction with changes in interest rates) but have a less marked effect on 
explanatory power. Even with these extra interaction terms, the lagged basis remains the most 
important variable in the credit spread equations since the adjusted R2 rises noticeably between 
panels A and B.  
It is noticeable that the highest explanatory power we are able to generate still leaves            
three-quarters of the variation in both CDS prices and credit spreads unexplained.  This 
corresponds closely to the proportions found by Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) in 
their analysis of monthly changes in credit spreads.  They find that the residual terms from their 
regressions are highly cross-correlated, suggesting the existence of an unidentified common 
systematic factor, and suggest that credit spreads may be largely driven by market-wide demand 
and supply shocks.  Principal components analysis of portfolios of the residuals of the regressions 
presented in Table G support similar conclusions.  Irrespective of the formation of the portfolios, 
the first principal component explains a large and essentially identical proportion of the variation 
(12) A Wald test confirms that the sum of the coefficients on the change in the long-term interest rate and the change 
in the slope of the yield curve is insignificantly different from zero. This suggests that only short-term (two-year) 
interest rates are important.  In panel C, therefore, we include the change in the short-term rate and the change in the 
slope of the yield curve in the general specification, but the latter is insignificant and therefore dropped from the 
specific model. 
(13) Again, these findings are robust to excluding BBB-rated companies from the sample. 
Table G—Continued 
Panel C: CDS price Credit spread Credit spread
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Change in short-term interest rate -10.68 -6.63 -8.31 -3.39 -8.64 -4.29 
CDSt-1uchange in short-term interest rate   -0.13 -2.77 -0.13 -3.18 
Firm-specific equity returns 31.85 3.03 21.96 2.78 25.25 3.91 
CDSt-1ufirm-specific equity returns -0.90 -5.77 -0.47 -4.02 -0.59 -5.31 
CDSt-1uchange in firm-specific 
volatility/100 
0.42 4.20     
Change in liquidity 0.18 4.56     
Lagged basis -0.05 -2.43 0.25 11.48 0.25 11.40 
Adjusted R2 0.26  0.25  0.24  
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of the residuals in both CDS and credit spread equations, with approximately equal weighting on 
each portfolio. As with Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) the regressions appear to 
be missing a common factor. This factor is common across reference entities and across both cash 
and credit derivative markets. (14)
One noteworthy feature of the results that carries over from the earlier regressions is the greater 
impact of macro factors (interest rates, term structure, equity market returns and equity market 
implied volatilities) on the credit spread than on CDS prices, in terms of both absolute magnitude 
and level of significance.  Conversely, firm-specific factors (equity returns and implied 
volatilities) have a greater effect on CDS prices than spreads.  For example, the coefficient 
estimates from panel B suggest that a 10% decrease in the equity price of a firm with a CDS price 
of 150 basis points (typical of a BBB-rated firm at the start of the sample) is associated with a 
simultaneous 10.3 basis points increase in the CDS price but just 4.6 basis points on the credit 
spread.  A similar equity price drop for a firm with a CDS price of 250 basis points (which was 
the price quoted for Ford in early 2002) is associated with a 20 basis point jump in CDS prices 
but just 9 basis points on the credit spread.  However, the arbitrage-based equivalence of CDS 
prices and credit spreads suggests that both are equally sensitive to firm-specific factors in the 
long run.  The large and significant lagged basis term is the mechanism through which the long-
run incorporation of firm-specific information takes place. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin 
(2001) note the sensitivity of the credit spread to market-wide factors, and question the validity of 
structural models of default that focus on firm-specific factors.  Our findings suggest that CDS 
prices react more to firm-specific factors and that credit spreads react to lagged changes in CDS 
prices, and so lend some support to the structural models.(15) 
(14) Residuals of the regressions reported in Table G panel C were collected. The 32 reference entities were 
repeatedly arbitrarily grouped into eight portfolios, taking simple averages of the residuals for both CDS and credit 
spread regressions.  Principal components analysis was performed on both sets of portfolios for the various 
groupings.  The first principal component explained between 46% and 61% of the variation in the portfolio residuals, 
depending on the grouping of the reference entities.  Detailed results are available on request. 
(15) Significant cheapest-to-deliver options due to the existence of convertible bonds would increase the sensitivity 
of CDS prices to firm-specific factors.  The value of the option to convert would increase as the firm-specific stock 
price and volatility increased.  This increase in the value of convertibility would raise the price of the bond and so 
reduce the value of the delivery option in the CDS price.  However, the coefficient on firm volatility should then be 
negative, rather than the positive coefficient we find.  Further, we obtain quantitatively similar results when we only 
consider US entities where the CTD option is less valuable. 
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6 Concluding comments 
This paper is a contribution to the relatively small empirical literature on credit derivatives.  To 
our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine credit default swap prices in a time series 
framework.  It addresses the validity and implications of the theoretical relationship between 
credit default swap prices and credit spreads using data for a small cross-section of US and 
European firms for which high-quality data are available.   
For this sample of investment-grade firms the theoretical arbitrage relationship linking credit 
spreads over the risk-free rate to CDS prices holds reasonably well on average for most of the 
companies (but especially for US firms) when the risk-free rate is proxied by the swap rate.  
Where the relationship does not hold, imperfections in the CDS market or measurement errors in 
the credit spread may be responsible.  Due to contract specifications in credit default swaps, 
particularly in Europe, a cheapest-to-deliver option may also be included in the CDS price 
making it an upper bound on the true price of credit risk.  We are unable to incorporate the repo 
cost of corporate bonds in our analysis due to a lack of reliable data.  As a result the measured 
credit spread may underestimate the true credit spread, and so forms a lower bound on the true 
price of credit risk.  Subject to these caveats, for most reference entities, both the cash bond and 
credit default swap markets appear to price credit risk equally on average.  We demonstrate, 
however, that price discovery takes place primarily in the CDS market and that the CDS market 
Granger causes the credit spread for those entities where the price of credit risk transitorily differs 
in the two markets.  We speculate that price discovery occurs in the CDS market because of 
(micro)structural factors that make it the most convenient location for the trading of credit risk, 
and because there are different participants in the cash and derivative market who trade for 
different reasons.   
The second part of the paper examined the determinants of changes in the two measures of the 
price of credit risk.  Variables suggested by the structural literature on credit risk are capable of 
explaining around one quarter of the weekly changes in credit default swap prices.  The same 
variables are less successful in capturing changes in credit spreads.  Firm-specific equity returns 
and implied volatilities are statistically more significant and of greater economic importance for 
CDS prices than for credit spreads.  The pricing discrepancy between CDS prices and credit 
spreads is closed primarily through changes in the credit spread, reflecting the CDS market’s lead 
in price discovery.  It is through this error correction mechanism that both CDS and credit 
spreads price credit risk equally in the long run.  We argue that these findings are supportive of 
the structural models of credit risk.  Nevertheless, in the absence of higher explanatory power, we 
41
must echo the call of Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) for further work on the 
factors that can account for the unexplained portion of CDS and credit spread changes. 
This study leaves several avenues open to further analysis.  Most obviously, since the credit 
derivatives market is still small and developing, these results are not necessarily representative of 
the period before or after our relatively short span of data.  Second, we have only analysed 
investment-grade corporate reference entities, although there are several sovereigns with very 
liquid CDS and bond markets.  Similarly, we have not considered speculative-grade corporate 
entities, primarily because their bonds typically trade well below par, particularly for fallen 
angels, which weakens the arbitrage relationship that underpins much of our analysis.  Finally, a 
microstructural analysis of price discovery across credit risk sensitive information releases would 
help to illuminate the price discovery process that was rather coarsely addressed at a daily 
frequency in this paper. 
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